Who Was The General Of The Continental Army

Who was the general of the continental army

Lee recognized the sense of giving the position to a native-born American, but expected to be given the role of second-in-command. He was disappointed when that role went to Artemas Wardwhom Lee considered too inexperienced for the job. Lee was appointed Click and third in line, but succeeded to second-in-command in when Ward resigned due to ill health.

William Moultrie. Lee was acclaimed as the "hero of Charleston", although according to some American accounts the credit for the defense was not his. Believing the commander-in-chief's hesitation to who was the general of the continental army the fort who was the general of the continental army be responsible for the loss, Lee wrote to Joseph Reed lamenting Washington's indecision, a criticism Washington read when he opened the letter believing it to be official business.

Although Lee's orders were at first discretionary, and although there were good tactical reasons for delaying, his slow progress has been characterized as insubordinate. Lee was ignorant of the changes that had occurred during his sixteen-month captivity; he was not aware of what Washington believed to be a conspiracy to install Gates as commander-in-chief or of the reformation of the Continental Army under the tutelage of Baron von Steuben.

In both, his generals largely agreed that Washington should avoid a major battle, Lee arguing that such a battle would be criminal, though a minority favored a limited engagement. At the second council, Lee argued the Continental Army was no match for the British Army, and favored allowing the British to proceed unimpeded and waiting until French military intervention following the Franco-American alliance could shift the balance in favor of the Americans.

He allocated some 4, troops, approximately a third of his army, to a vanguard that could land a heavy blow on the British without risking his army in a general engagement. The main body would follow and provide support if circumstances warranted. In his haste to catch the British, Lafayette pushed the vanguard to exhaustion and outran his supplies, prompting Washington to send Lee, who had in the meantime changed his mind, to replace him.

Washington was with the main body of just over 7, troops and the bulk of the artillery at Manalapan Bridgefour miles six kilometres behind Lee. Lee believed he had full discretion on whether and how to attack and called his own war council after Washington left. He intended to advance as soon as he knew the British were on the move, in the hope of catching their rearguard when it was most vulnerable. In the absence of any intelligence about British intentions or the terrain, Lee believed it would be useless to form a precise plan of his here.

He ordered Brigadier General Anthony Wayne with some men to fix the rearguard in place while he led the remainder of the vanguard on a left hook with the intention of outflanking the British, but he neglected to inform his subordinates, Brigadier General Charles Scott and Brigadier General William Maxwellof his plan. Lee's confidence crept into reports back to Washington that implied "the certainty of success. They became concerned that the arriving British troops would isolate them, and decided to withdraw. To their left, Wayne's isolated troops, having witnessed the British marching back, were also withdrawing.

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With his troops withdrawing without orders, it became clear to Lee that he was losing control of the vanguard, and with his immediate command now only 2, strong, he realized his plan to envelop the British rearguard was who was the general of the continental army. His priority became the safety of his troops in the face of superior numbers, and he ordered a general retreat. Lee believed he had conducted a model "retrograde manoeuver in the face and under fire of an enemy" and claimed his troops moved with "order and precision.

When two of General Washington's aides informed Lee that the main body was still some two miles three kilometres away and asked him what to report back, Lee replied "that he really did not know what to say. In the space of some ten minutes, his confidence gave way to alarm as he encountered a straggler bearing the first news of Lee's retreat and then whole units in retreat. None of the officers Washington met could tell him where they were supposed to be going or what they were supposed to be doing.

As the commander-in-chief rode on ahead, he saw the vanguard in full retreat but no sign of the British.

At aroundWashington found Lee marshalling the last of his command across the middle morass, marshy ground southeast of a bridge over the Spotswood Middle Brook. He blamed faulty intelligence and his officers, especially Scott, for pulling back without orders, leaving him no choice but to retreat in the face of a superior force, and reminded Washington that he had opposed the attack in the first place. Lee followed at a distance, bewildered and believing he had been relieved of command. He then offered Lee a choice: remain and command the rearguard, or fall back across the bridge and organize the main defenses on Perrine's Hill. Lee opted for the former while Washington departed to take care of the latter.

AtSteuben arrived at Englishtown and relieved Lee of command. But on June 30, after protesting his innocence to all who would listen, Lee wrote an insolent letter to Washington in which he blamed "dirty earwigs" for turning Washington against him, claimed his decision to retreat had saved the day and pronounced Washington to be "guilty of an act of cruel injustice" towards him. Instead of the apology Lee was tactlessly seeking, Washington replied that the tone of Lee's letter was "highly improper" and that he would initiate an official inquiry into Lee's conduct.]